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COMMENT
ARKANSAS MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:
AN AFFIRMATIVE APPROACH TO PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
On December 16, 1985, the Arkansas Supreme Court granted the
Arkansas Bar Association's petition for the adoption of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct,' subject to certain modifications recom-
mended by the Bar's Special Committee on the Model Rules.2 The
Rules replace the existing Arkansas Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity," which had been adopted per curiam on June 21, 1976, effective
July 1, 1976. The new rules are "rules of reason" to be interpreted with
reference to the purposes of legal representation and the court rules,
statutes, and substantive and procedural law that help shape the law-
yer's role.4 "The Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical
considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human
activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply pro-
vide a framework for the ethical practice of law."'
Neither can this comment exhaust all the legal and ethical ramifi-
cations presented by the adoption of the Model Rules.6 The purpose of
this comment is to alert practicing attorneys to some of the more sig-
nificant changes pertaining to the lawyer-client relationship, advocacy,
conduct within the firm, and the dissemination of information about
legal services. In the words of the late Robert J. Kutak, chairman of
1. In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n: Petition for the Adoption of Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 287 Ark. 495, 702 S.W.2d 326 (1985) (effective Jan. 1, 1986).
2. These changes appear as Exhibit B to the court's per curiam order. 287 Ark. at 497-98,
702 S.W.2d at 326-27.
3. 260 Ark. 910 (1976).
4. In re Bar Petition, 287 Ark. at 502-03, 702 S.W.2d at 330.
5. Id. at 503, 702 S.W.2d at 330.
6. For specific ethical problems, the practitioner is strongly recommended to consult the rules
and the more detailed guidance given in the comments to the rules. Other recommended refer-
ences are G. HAZARD & HODEs, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1985); LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (ABA/
BNA).
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the A.B.A. Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards,
widely known as the Kutak Commission:
7
Let it be clearly understood that the Model Rules do indeed change
and change fundamentally the regime of the 1969 code, the current
form of our statement of professional standards. But the Model Rules
are meant to work no fundamental change in the law of professional
responsibility, as opposed to its particular articulation in various codes
in various places. . . .Where the articulation of that law in other
codes was ambiguous, or contradictory, or silent, the Rules seek to
clarify, to rationalize (in the finer sense) and to guide the conscien-
tious lawyer in what conscientious lawyers have always done: balanc-
ing competing duties in the professionally responsible representation
of clients.8
Thus, the discussion of the significant "changes" presented by Ar-
kansas' adoption of the Model Rules will necessarily entail some analy-
sis of existing case law.9 Further insight is provided by the many arti-
cles that have been written both in favor of, and in opposition to, the
Model Rules. 10 Since it is impractical to deal with the entire Model
Rules in this comment, citations to related provisions and authorities
will be given when appropriate without extended discussion.
It should also be noted at the outset that the Model Rules, which
set forth the various rules (for disciplinary purposes) and corresponding
comment are assembled under eight topics.11 The Ethical Considera-
tions of the former Code have been abandoned entirely. The purpose of
this format is "to establish clear and enforceable rules of conduct for
lawyers in the various contexts in which they practice and in their rela-
tionship with the public; thus avoiding 'the difficulty and uncertainty of
attempting to legislate normative values at two levels-aspiration and
7. Kutak, Model Rules: Law for Lawyers or Ethics for the Profession, 38 REc. A.B. CITY
N.Y. 140 (1983) (introduction by Fales).
8. Id. at 144 (emphasis in original).
9. Indeed, the great majority of cases that have discussed the impact of the Model Rules
have done so in the course of applying the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. This
is understandable since the Model Rules were not adopted by the ABA House of Delegates until
August 2, 1983. As of February 26, 1986, only eleven states-Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Washing-
ton-had adopted the Model Rules. See Nix v. Whiieside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 995 n.4 (1986).
10. See, e.g., Pitts & Kanwit, Two Different Views of the ABA's Proposed Model Rules, 71
ILL. B.J. 282 (1983); Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, The Kutak Rules, and the
Trial Lawyer's Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 739 (1981);
Koskoff & Lumbard, Breach of Faith: The Kutak Rules, 3 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 1 (1981).
11. The headings are: Client-lawyer relationship, counsel or, advocate, transactions with per-
sons other than clients, law firms and associates, public service, information about legal services,
and maintaining the integrity of the profession.
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PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
minimum conduct.' "12 In addition to enforcement under the Model
Rules, lawyers should be alert to the possibility of further ethical pro-
nouncements in the substantive areas in which the attorney practices."
1. Client-Lawyer Relationship
"In preparing the Final Draft [of the Model Rules], it seemed
self-evident that lawyers exist and are defined primarily in their rela-
tionships with clients. Thus, the parameters of the client-lawyer rela-
tionship were the starting point. They remain the opening theme of the
Model Rules."'1 4 While some commentators have not identified them as
substantive changes in the former Code,15 Rule 1.2, describing the
scope and limitations of the attorney-client relationship at its inception,
and rule 1.4, describing the lawyer's affirmative duty to communicate,
are significant new provisions of the Model Rules.'"
A. Scope of Representation & Communication
Rule 1.2 establishes the respective roles of the client and lawyer in
defining their relationship. The rule is generally derived from principles
of agency law. 17 However, prior to the adoption of the Model Rules,
the allocation of decision-making power had never been fully addressed
12. Armstrong, The Kutak Commission Report: Retrospect and Prospect, 11 CAP. U.L. REV.
475, 491 (1982), (quoting Kutak, Evaluating the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
A.B.F. RES. J. 1016, 1018 (1980)).
13. Cf. Block & Ferris, SEC Rule 2(e)-A New Standard for Ethical Conduct or an Unau-
thorized Web of Ambiguity?, II CAP. UL. REV. 501 (1982) (questioning the S.E.C.'s authority
and expertise in suspending or disbarring its practitioners for ethical violations); Frivolous Attor-
ney, Nat'l L.J., March 3, 1986, at 5, col. I (attorney barred from practice before the Tax Court
for six months for repeatedly advancing arguments that wages do not constitute income).
14. Hayward & Hazard,, Model Rules of Professional Conduct: A Perspective, 63 CHI. B.
REc. 290, 292 (1982).
15. See Armstrong, supra note 12, at 494-97.
16. Although it contains no explicit cross-references, Rule 1.2 is closely linked to a number of
other central rules, including Rule 1.6 (confidentiality), Rule 1.16 (declining or terminating repre-
sentation), Rule 3.3 (client perjury), and rule 4.1 (truthtelling by the lawyer). G. HAZARD & W.
HODES. supra note 6, at 17. Similarly, the duty to communicate with the client arises in many
contexts. See, e.g., State v. Boyer, 103 N.M. Ct. App. 655, 712 P.2d 1 (1985) (defendant's ap-
peal); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Drury, 455 So.2d 1387, 1390 (La. 1984) (failure to disclose a
financial conflict of interest deprived clients of "a valuable intangible interest;" i.e., negotiation of
terms of employment with full knowledge of all material information).
17. ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 23 (1984) (citations
omitted). See also Veasey v. Joshlin, 257 Ark. 422, 516 S.W.2d 596 (1974) (under Arkansas
Law, attorney has no implied authority to settle a case); Ashworth v. Hankins, 248 Ark. 567, 452
S.W.2d. 838 (1970) (mere retainer does not authorize attorney to act beyond scope of actual or
apparent authority).
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in the profession's standards of conduct.18 Under Rule 1.2 "[olbjectives
are for the client, means are for the lawyer, and only 'sometimes' are
they not easily distinguished."1 9 The duty to communicate is inherent
in defining the scope of the representation since the "lawyer shall abide
by the client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation...
and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to
be pursued."20 The lawyer may limit the scope of the representation,
but only if the client consents after consultation." Rule 1.2(a) also re-
quires that the attorney honor the client's decisions regarding whether
to accept a settlement offer, the plea to be entered, whether to waive a
jury trial and whether to testify. Case law has recognized the client's
ultimate authority to decide whether to take an appeal, but criminal
defense counsel need not raise every non-frivolous issue in order to sur-
vive an ineffective assistance claim. 3 The familiar rule that the attor-
ney shall not engage, or assist a client, in conduct known to be criminal
or fraudulent is contained in Rule 1.2(d).24 "Rule 1.2(e), referred to by
critics and sponsors alike as the Miranda provision, requires lawyers to
warn clients, in appropriate cases, that lawyers are not for hire as ac-
complices."'2 5 In the litigation context, the requirements of Rule 1.2 can
be found26 in the following excerpt from Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey:27
i8. ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 23 (1984).
19. Brown & Dauer, Professional Responsibility in Nonadversarial Lawyering. A Review of
the Model Rules, A.B.F. RES. J. 519, 531 (1982). The authors assert that this separation of au-
thority, while suitable in an advocacy context, is too simple in a non-adversarial, planning and
counseling context where the client's stated objectives may only be a "means" to a more basic
purpose. Id. at 532. See generally Redmount, Client Counseling and the Regulation of Profes-
sional Conduct, 26 ST. Louis. U.L. REV. 829 (1982).
20. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT as adopted in Arkansas [hereinafter cited as
AMR] Rule 1.2(a) (1985), 287 Ark. at 507, 702 S.W.2d at 333.
21. Id. Rule 1.2 (c).
22. See also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
23. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983). On the former point, cf. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
v. Koller, 105 S. Ct. 2757, 2763 (1985) ("the decision to appeal should turn entirely on the
client's interest," citing MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7(b) and 2.1). On the
latter point, see also Smith v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 2661 (1986) (deliberate, but mistaken, failure
to raise issue); Murray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639 (1986) (inadvertent failure to raise issue). But
cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 106 S. Ct. 2574 (1986) (since failure to raise fourth amendment
issue was not due to any tactical decision, but rather to counsel's inadequate preparation and
ignorance of the law, the defendant was denied effective assistance).
24. For illustrative cases, see Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1208
(l1th Cir. 1985); Davis v. Goodson, 276 Ark. 337, 635 S.W.2d 226 (1982).
25. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 6, at 18 (also noting that if the lawyer is drawn
unwittingly into wrongful conduct, he or she may be forced to turn on the client, citing Rule 1.6).
26. Rule 1.2 was not intended to change the substantive law in this area. See Kutak, supra
note 7, at 144; Armstrong, supra note 12, at 494-97.
27. 611 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Ill. 1985).
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Litigation lawyers have a broad responsibility under Rule 11 and the
Code of Professional Responsibility (now the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct): to confer with the client about the facts-and not to
accept the client's version on faith, but to probe the client in that
respect ("reasonable inquiry"); to do the lawyers' homework on the
law; and then to counsel the client about just which claims the law
reasonably supports in terms of the facts the lawyers' proper investi-
gation has disclosed. That often involves counseling the cli-
ent-sometimes against the tide of the client's displeasure-as to how
best to vindicate the client's interests without abusing another's. In
some instances that may involve advising a client not to pursue a
claim or a theory of recovery that in a technical sense (of surviving a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion) might perhaps go forward, but by rights
should not. When a lawyer fails in that respect-when a lawyer ac-
cepts or even encourages the role of a "hired gun" in the worst
sense-the costs to the parties and to the courts are often substantial,
as they have been here.2 8
In summary, Rule 1.2 requires the lawyer to defer to certain deci-
sions of the client, but only after full disclosure of the pertinent law
and the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct. Representation
does not constitute endorsement of the client's views29 and the lawyer
may limit the objectives of the representation after consultation. 0
Thus, the resulting attorney-client relationship will resemble a joint un-
dertaking guided by the lawyer's ethics.
With regard to communication in its own right, "Rule 1.4(a) . . .
is a prophylactic rule based on the judgment that lack of adequate
communication is at least a contributing factor in most breakdowns of
the client-lawyer relationship." 3' Not only must the lawyer routinely
volunteer information about the status of matters entrusted to him,32 he
28. Id. at 519. The opinion further points out that the best safeguard against frivolous claims
is the "integrity and good sense of practicing lawyers who, as officers of the court, have both an
ethical and legal duty to screen the claims of their clients for factual veracity and legal suffi-
ciency," citing Rule 3.1. Id. (quoting Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir. 1985)).
29. AMR Rule 1.2(b), 287 Ark. at 507, 702 S.W.2d at 333.
30. Id. Rule 1.2(c)
31. G. HAZARD & W, HODES, supra note 6, at 65. In this regard, note that Rule 1.5(b) now
requires that "the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in
writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation" when the lawyer
has not regularly represented the client.
32. Even in the absence of an attorney-client relationship, a lawyer may have a duty to com-
municate. See Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding an attorney who was
an officer of subject managerial and publishing companies breached his fiduciary duty to a profes-
sional entertainer by failing to advise her to seek independent counsel. The court found Kurnit's
introduction as "the lawyer" and his explanation to the Croces of the "legal ramifications" of the
1985-86]
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must also promptly provide requested details, so long as such requests
are reasonable."3 Rule 1.4(b) explicitly demands communication to the
extent necessary for the client to make informed decisions under Rule
1.2. The duty to communicate effectively has also been recognized as
necessary to maintain the public's confidence in the legal profession.3'
B. Confidentiality
Another significant aspect of the attorney-client relationship, both
under the Code and the model Rules, is attorney-client confidentiality,
"one of the most hotly debated topics of professional ethics. ' 35 Indeed,
"Rule 1.6 caused the greatest controversy of the entire rule drafting
process as it went through its various stages of consideration. '3 6 The
fact that both public and professional opinion was aroused3 7 attests to
the central position of confidentiality in the representation of clients.
38
The general rule of confidentiality has been extended to require all
information relating to the representation to be kept confidential unless
the client can be said to have consented, or unless an exception ap-
plies.8 9 The modern purpose of the rule is to enhance the effectiveness
of legal advice by encouraging clients and their lawyers to confer fully
and frankly on all matters relating to the client's reasons for seeking
such advice.40 Commenting on the drafting of Rule 1.6, Chairman
recording, publishing, and managerial contracts gave or should have given the lawyer reason to
believe they would rely on his advice).
33. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 6, at 65.
34. "[T]he findings of ... polls . . . suggest that the public's perception of lawyers is that
• . . lawyers do not care whether their clients fully understand what needs to be done and why."
Burger, The Role of the Law School in the Teaching of Legal Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 377, 379-80 (1980).
35. D'Amato & Eberle, Three Models of Legal Ethics, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 761, 763, 776
(1983). The authors give a thorough analysis of the two dominant opposing viewpoints, i.e., the
"authority" model, placing prime importance on the client's interests, versus the "socialist" model,
placing prime importance on serving the public, and propose a third view, the "deontological"
model. The deontological model says that some acts are morally obligatory regardless of their
consequences to human happiness. The authors assert that ABA Rule 1.6(b)(l) reflects this ap-
proach by allowing disclosure if that is the only way to prevent imminent death or substantial
bodily harm to a third party.
36. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 6, at 88.
37. Id.
38. Note that the evidentiary privilege "exists apart from, and is not coextensive with, the
ethical confidentiality precepts." United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 293 & n.15 (5th Cir.
1986) (citing G. HAZARD & W. HoDEs, supra note 6, at 89-90).
39. AMR Rule 1.6, 287 Ark. at 516, 702 S.W.2d at 339.
40. AMR Rule 1.6 comment, 287 Ark. at 517, 702 S.W.2d at 339. The narrower, eviden-
tiary privilege is also premised on encouraging full and frank disclosure. See Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383-(1981) and cases cited therein; Arkansas Nat'l Bank v. Cleburne County
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Kutak stated:
Like other highly valued and critically important rights, confidential-
ity has limits. . . . We must rightly reject any motion [sic] that the
professional role should somehow turn the lawyer into a policeman.
And we must also rightly reject any notion that the professional role
should somehow turn lawyers into co-conspirators with their clients.
Between those two poles, the bar must carve out its proper range of
activity, the zone of zealous representation within the bounds of law.4'
The ABA's version of Rule 1.6 struck the balance by permitting
the attorney to reveal information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm."' However, the Ar-
kansas version struck this balance by permitting disclosure to the ex-
tent reasonably believed necessary to prevent the client from commit-
ting "a criminal act,"4 thus continuing its practice under DR 4-
101(c)(3)." 4 While a lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose in-
formation covered by the confidentiality rule is not subject to re-exami-
nation for disciplinary purpose, 41 this discretion should not be con-
strued as a shield from tort liability. The preamble indicates that the
rules "are not designed to be a basis for civil liability" and "nothing in
the rules should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of
Bank, 258 Ark. 329, 525 S.W.2d 82 (1975) (the privilege is designed to secure subjective peace of
mind for the client).
41. Kutak, Postscript: The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, II CAP. U.L. REV. 585,
590 (1982).
42. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1). Both the ABA and Arkansas
preambles to the Model Rules state that "[tlhe lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose
information under Rule 1.6 should not be subject to reexamination. Permitting such reexamina-
tion would be incompatible with the general policy of promoting compliance with law through
assurances that communications will be protected against disclosure." 287 Ark. at 504, 702
S.W.2d at 331. Even when an exception is applicable, a lawyer may disclose information only to
the extent reasonably believed necessary to carry out the purpose of the exception. G. HAZARD &
W. HODES, supra note 6, at 100. By the Rules' Terminology section, the requisite belief is an
actual belief that comports with what a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer would believe.
287 Ark. at 504, 702 S.W.2d at 332.
43. AMR Rule 1.6(b)(1), 287 Ark. at 516, 702 S.W.2d at 339.
44. Id. at 521, 702 S.W.2d at 342. For an argument that the rule should call for mandatory
disclosure to prevent significant harm, see Burke,"Truth in Lawyering": An Essay on Lying and
Deceit in the Practice of Law, 38 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1984). For an interesting approach suggesting
that the disclosure decision should depend on balancing the interests at stake on an ad hoc basis,
see Brennan v. Brennan, 281 Pa. Super. 362, 422 A.2d 510, 518 (1980) (Hoffman, J., concur-
ring). For an argument that the confidentiality requirement should be relaxed in non-litigation
and non-adversarial settings, see Kuhn, Disclosure Versus Confidentiality, 29 CATH. LAW. 356
(1985).
45. See supra note 42.
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lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a
duty."'4 6 Conversely, since the Rule presuppose a larger legal context,
including the substantive law that helps shape the lawyer's role,47 an
attorney's potential tort liability would not be affected by Rule 1.6.48
Arkansas Rule 1.6 also has an additional provision that "fn]either this
Rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving
notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or
disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like." 4
The Kutak Commission had proposed another exception to the
confidentiality requirement allowing disclosure if it was necessary to
prevent substantial injury to the financial or property interests of an-
other.50 This proposal was not included in either the Model Rules or
the Arkansas version of the Model Rules. 1 However, Rule 4.1 (b) pro-
vides that "[i]n the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly . . . (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person
when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent
act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6."' 1 Under
the Arkansas rule disclosure is required by Rule 1.6 if the client's act is
defined as criminal.5 3 But for non-criminal fraudulent acts, no such dis-
closure is authorized.64 The comment to Rule 4.1 indicates that "sub-
stantive law may require a lawyer to disclose certain information to
avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud," but
subjects such disclosure to Rule 1.6. Since the "substantial injury to
financial or property interests" exception has not been adopted, Rule
4.1 is in tension with Rule 1.6. Hazard and Hodes argue that courts
will inevitably read this exception back into Rule 1.6 in order to protect
the lawyer from a potential claim by the client that the lawyer was a
knowing accomplice, or that the lawyer was solely responsible for the
46. 287 Ark. at 504, 702 S.W.2d at 331.
47. Id. at 503, 702 S.W.2d at 330.
48. The reasoning of the cases imposing liability on physicians, psychiatrists, and psycholo-
gists for their failure to warn third parties of the forseeable dangers posed by their clients appears
equally applicable to attorneys. See-generally Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 1201 (1978).
49. AMR Rule 1.6(c), 287 Ark. at 516, 702 S.W.2d at 339. This provision was taken from
the comment and inserted into the rule. In re Bar Petition, 287 Ark. at 497, exhibit B, 702
S.W.2d at 326-27 (1985). Thus, rather than serving as a guide to interpreting Rule 1.6, subsection
(c) is authoritative. See 287 Ark. at 504, 702 S.W.2d at 331.
50. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 6, at 91.
51. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6; AMR Rule 1.6.
52. AMR Rule 4.1, 287 Ark. at 570, 702 S.W.2d at 376.
53. AMR Rule 1.6(b)(l), 287 Ark. at 516, 702 S.W.2d at 339.
54. Id.




C. Conflicts of Interest
Kutak stated that the Model Rules make advances in the area of
conflicts of interest in two ways. 57 First, the Rules focus on actual con-
flict of interest situations, thus discarding the inherent vagueness in the
former "appearance of impropriety" standard." Second, the Rules ad-
dress conflicts with regard to former clients, an area in which the Code
was silent.59 The general duty to avoid conflicts of interest continues
under the Rules." The conflict may arise with regard to the receipt of
confidential information," representing an interest adverse to a former
client,62 class actions,63 financial interests in fee arrangements,64 the si-
multaneous negotiation of settling claims on the merits along with a
settlement of costs and attorney fees,6" the hiring of a defendant's
counsel by a co-defendant, 6" and the sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel.67 In multiple representation situations, despite
the clients' consent, the lawyer may not simultaneously represent more
than one party if he cannot adequately represent their different inter-
56. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 6, at 91.
57. Kutak, Model Rules: Law for Lawyers or Ethics for the Profession, 38 REc. A.B. CITY
N.Y. 140, 146 (1983).
58. Id. See also In re Hof, 102 A.D.2d 39, 478 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1984). Cf. United States v.
Washington, 782 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding mere appearance of impropriety insufficient to
override defendant's sixth amendment right to retain counsel of his choice).
59. Kutak, supra note 57. But cf. Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1984) (assert-
ing that disqualification of a law firm for representing an interest adverse to a former client is the
proper result under both the Code and the Rules).
60. See, e.g., Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 908 n.3 (2d Cir. 1984).
61. See State v. Martinez, 100 N.M. Ct. App. 532, 673 P.2d 509 (1983); Alexander v. Supe-
rior Court, 141 Ariz. 157, 685 P.2d 1309 (1984).
62. See Masiello v. Perini Corp., 394 Mass. 842, 477 N.E.2d 1020 (1985). Under Rule 1.9,
an attorney may not represent another in the same or a substantially related matter if the new
client's interests are materially adverse to the former client, unless the former client consents after
consultation. See also In re Conduct of Brandsness, 299 Or. 420, 702 P.2d 1098 (1985) (refining
the "significantly related" standard to two subsets: matter specific and information specific).
63. See Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112 (1ith Cir. 1985); In re Corn Derivatives Anti-
trust Litigation, 748 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1984).
64. See United States v. Marrera, 768 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1985).
65. See Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. 1531 (1986), rev'g 743 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1984), and
cases cited therein.
66. A recent Eighth Circuit case rejected an ineffective assistance claim allegedly due to the
defendant's lawyer being hired and paid by his co-defendants. See United States v. Shaughnessy,
782 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
67. For a thorough discussion of the sixth amendment analysis in this area, see Wilson v,
Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1985).
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ests.18 One jurisdiction now imposes a duty on counsel and the trial
court to make a record regarding the investigation of, and consent to,
multiple representation in criminal cases.6 9 Under Arkansas law, an at-
torney may not simultaneously represent opposing parties even in unre-
lated matters, 70 and the conflict may arise from the personal interests
of the lawyer and client.71 It has also been stated that the rule regard-
ing disqualification of the lawyer likely to be a necessary witness is not
materially different under the Model Rules.72
The focus on actual conflict of interest situations is most pro-
nounced in rule 1.8, which gives specific guidance in certain areas that
inevitably involve conflicts of interest."' The Rule has eliminated the
requirement that the client remain ultimately liable for court costs and
litigation expenses advanced by the lawyer 74 and now expressly permits
a lawyer to pay these expenses on behalf of a client.75 It has added the
requirement that in settling a malpractice claim, an unrepresented cli-
ent or former client must first be advised in writing of the propriety of
independent representation . 6 The Rule also affirmatively prohibits a
lawyer from preparing an instrument giving him or his parent, child,
sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client unless the client is
related to the donee.7
The propriety of lawyers related by blood or marriage representing
opposing parties was not addressed in the ABA Model Code.7 8 rhe.
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
addressed this issue in 1975.79 It noted that the fear of disqualification
had caused many firms to avoid hiring lawyers married to a lawyer or
68. In re Bentley, 141 Ariz. 593, 688 P.2d 601 (1984)(en banc).
69. Hopps v. State Bd. of Parole, 127 N.H. 133, 500 A.2d 355 (1985).
70. See City of Little Rock v. Cash, 277 Ark. 494, 644 S.W.2d 229 (1982) (the remedy was
to deny the statutory attorneys' fees).
71. See Sikes v. Segers, 266 Ark. 654, 587 S.W.2d 554 (1979) (representing a husband while
engaging in an undisclosed meretricious relationship with his wife held a conflict of interest).
72. Optyl Eyewear Fashion Int'l Corp. v. Style Companies, 760 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1985).
73. See AMR rule 1.8, 287 Ark. at 526-27, 702 S.W.2d at 346-47.
74. AMR Rule 1.8(e)(1), 287 Ark. at 526, 702 S.W.2d at 346.
75. AMR Rule 1.8(e)(2), 287 Ark. at 526, 702 S.W.2d at 346.
76. AMR Rule 1.8(h), 287 Ark. at 527, 702 S.W.2d at 346-47.
77. AMR Rule 1.8(c), 287 Ark. at 526, 702 S.W.2d at 346. It has been held that a violation
of this rule in a testamentary context gives rise to a presumption of undue influence. Park v.
George, 282 Ark. 155, 667 S.W.2d 644 (1984); Estate of Younger, 314 Pa. Super. 480, 461 A.2d
259 (1983).
78. ABA., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 105 (1984).
79. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 340 (1975),
reprinted in, ABA, Formal and Informal Ethics Opinions 103 (1985).
698 [Vol. 8:689
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
law student, 80 but that no express prohibition existed against related or
married lawyers representing opposing parties.8 1 Thus, it declined to
interpret the Model Code as imposing a per se prohibition against such
representations. Instead, it held that lawyer spouses or relatives, like
any lawyer, should fully explain any situation in which a client might
question the lawyer's loyalty, and should thereby leave the employment
decision to the client.82 This logic is reflected in Rule 1.8(i).13 The com-
ment further provides that any disqualification that may result is per-
sonal, and is not imputed to other members of the firm.
8 4
2. Advocacy
As a litigator, the attorney is guided by Rules 3.1-3.9.85 The
preference under the Model Rules towards the lawyer's responsibility
to the tribunal as opposed to the client's ultimate objective has been
stated in the following language:
The Model Rules recognize a duty which the advocate owes to a tri-
bunal which might require the disclosure of client confidences to the
tribunal in order to avoid material misrepresentations and the presen-
tation of evidence which the lawyer reasonably believes is false. Com-
pare Model Rule 3.3 (Candor Toward Tribunal) which emphasizes
the attorney's duty of disclosure, with CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 and 7-26 which emphasize the advocate's duty
to zealously represent clients within the bounds of the law, and which
prohibit the presentation of evidence only when such evidence is
known to be false.80
The duty of candor and fairness has been held to require the dis-
closure of otherwise confidential information to opposing counsel and
the court. In Kath v. Western Media, Inc.87 the Wyoming Supreme
Court held that a letter indicating the lawyer had become partisan and
80. ABA, Formal and Informal Ethics Opinions 103 (1985).
81. Id. at 103-04.
82. Id. at 105.
83. ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 105 (1984)
84. AMR Rule 1.8(i) comment, 287 Ark. at 528, 702 S.W.2d at 347.
85. Id. at Rules 3.1-3.9, 287 Ark. at 555-69, 702 S.W.2d at 366-76.
86. Block & Ferris, supra note 13, at 501-02 n.5. The authors also note that the advocate's
duty to advise the court of contrary controlling precedent and to avoid misleading the court re-
mains unchanged (citing MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3). See also
Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1131 n.44 (11th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that lead counsel
would be subject to discipline for failing to apprise the district court of a dismissal, on the merits,
of "virtually identical" claims in the Northern District of California).
87. 684 P.2d 98 (Wyo. 1984).
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had even contemplated suing the opposing counsel's clients long before
an eventual settlement, should have been disclosed.8 8 Furthermore, the
duty of candor under the Rules resolves an ambiguity in the Code by
requiring the lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures when he dis-
covers he has already offered perjured testimony or false evidence, even
if this includes disclosure of otherwise confidential information."
In Nix v. Whiteside9° the United States Supreme Court addressed
the classic dilemma that occurs when a defense attorney has every rea-
son to believe his client is about to commit perjury.91 The attorney in-
formed the client that if he allowed him to testify falsely he would be
suborning perjury, that it would be his duty to advise the court of what
the client was doing and that the attorney felt he was committing per-
jury.92 The jury returned a verdict of second-degree murder. 93 The Su-
preme Court of Iowa affirmed the conviction.94 The Eighth Circuit sub-
sequently granted the defendant's writ of habeas corpus, 95 reasoning
that the threat to disclose the client's confidences breached the stan-
dards of effective representation set forth in Strickland v. Washing-
ton.96 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 97
The five-member majority opinion analyzed the issue in terms of
whether the attorney's conduct fell within the wide range of profes-
sional responses to threatened client perjury acceptable under the sixth
amendment. 98 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger reasoned
that the attorney's "duty [of loyalty] is limited to legitimate, lawful
conduct compatible with the very nature of a trial as a search for the
88. The court vacated the order confirming the settlement.
89. See AMR Rule 3.3(a)(4), (b), 287 Ark. at 556, 702 S.W.2d at 367, and code compari-
son. Id. at 560, 702 S.W.2d at 369-70. This treatment is in line with the majority of cases that
have considered the issue. ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT at 214
(1984). See also Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
90. 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986) rev'g Whiteside v. Scurr, 750 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1984).
91. Prior to his murder trial, the defendant had consistently told counsel that he had not seen
a gun, but that he was convinced his victim had had a gun in his hand. The attorney interviewed
the defendant's companions who were present during the stabbing and none had seen a gun. Dur-
ing preparation for direct examination about a week before trial, the defendant told the attorney
for the first time he had seen something "metallic" in the victim's hand. When questioned about
this the defendant responded that "in Howard Cook's case there was a gun. If I don't say I saw a
gun I'm dead." 106 S. Ct. at 991.
92. Id. at 992.
93. Id.
94. State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1978).
95. Whiteside v. Scurr, 750 F.2d 713, 714-15 (8th Cir. 1984).
96. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
97. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
98. Id. at 994.
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truth." 9 His opinion traces the evolution of professional standards, not-
ing the emphasis that has universally been placed on the lawyer's duty
to uphold the law and the exceptions to otherwise responsible conduct
that arise when the client contemplates criminal activity.' The major-
ity stated, "It is universally agreed that at a minimum the attorney's
first duty when confronted with a proposal for perjurious testimony is
to attempt to dissuade the client from the unlawful course of con-
duct.""'' They also noted that the Rule finally promulgated in the cur-
rent Model Rules rejects any participation or passive role by counsel in
allowing perjury to be presented unchallenged. 0 2 All nine Justices
agreed that the defendant was not denied the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel by the attorney's actions and thus, the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus was reversed.1"3
The appropriate caveat to the majority's ethics analysis is empha-
sized in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion. 04 He flatly states that
the Supreme Court "has no constitutional authority to establish rules
of ethical conduct for lawyers practicing in the state courts. Nor does
the Court enjoy any statutory grant of jurisdiction over legal ethics.
105
. . . Lawyers, judges, bar associations, students and others should un-
derstand that the problem has not now been 'decided.' "106 However,
the direct guidance contained in the majority opinion, applicable to
99. Id. As a circuit court judge, the Chief Justice had stated, "At the trial stage [the law-
yer's] duty is to put the prosecution to its proof, to test the case against the accused, to insist that
the procedural safeguards be followed and to put forward evidence which is valid, relevant and
helpful to his client. . . . In short he is to put his client's best foot forward." Johnson v. United
States, 360 F.2d 844, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J., concurring).
100. 106 S. Ct. at 994-95.
101. Id. at 996 (citing rule 3.3 comment and Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REv.
809, 846 (1977)).
102. 106 S. Ct. at 996 n.6. But cf., Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1331 (8th Cir. 1984)
and Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978) (both approving use of the "free
narrative").
103. 106 S. Ct. at 999-1000. Model Rules provisions cited include 1.2(d), the duty not to
counsel or assist the performance of known criminal or fraudulent conduct; Rule 3.3, requiring the
disclosure of false evidence even if client confidences are compromised; and Rule 1.16(a)(l), per-
mitting. withdrawal if the representation will result in violating the rules of professional conduct or
other law. Somewhat surprisingly, the majority opinion did not cite the Miranda provision in Rule
1.2(e), requiring the lawyer to consult with the client regarding the relevant limitations on the
lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules.
Seemingly, the attorney in Whiteside strictly complied with this provision.
104. 106 S. Ct. at 1000 (Brennan, J., concurring).
105. Id. He cites the majority's own caveat that it must be careful not to constitutionalize
particular standards of conduct acceptable under the sixth amendment and thereby intrude on the
states' proper authority to define appropriate conduct for their practitioners.
106. Id. The concurring opinion of justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens shared this view.
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threatened client perjury, is likely to be given much deference from
courts all over the county.
3. Conduct Within the Firm
The prevalence of law firms in today's legal practice has been rec-
ognized to a certain extent by the American Bar Association within its
Model Rules. 10 7 The Code has been criticized for its failure to give any
guidance to "intra-firm ethics".,08 While Rules 5.1, governing the con-
duct of supervisory lawyers and 5.2, governing that of subordinate law-
yers, are innovations of the Model Rules, they do not represent a radi-
cal departure from current law.' 09 "In particular, Rule 5.1 does not
impose vicarious disciplinary liability upon a supervisor who has not
participated in or ratified a violation of the Rules. Nor does Rule 5.2
give a subordinate an immunity from professional responsibility." 110
Rule 5.1(a), however, does provide that all partners in a firm are super-
visory lawyers per se.'11 The Rules "provide that all partners have a
duty to see that reasonable measures are taken by the firm" to ensure
compliance with professional standards." 2 But partners in a large firm
can have a remote and indirect supervisory relationship to associates
with whom they do not regularly collaborate.'" As the comment to
Rule 5.1 indicates, the degree of responsibility, and therefore the de-
gree of culpability, "can depend on the firm's structure and the nature
of its practice.""" Similar duties of reasonable supervision are imposed
107. See Spayd v. Turner, Granzow & Hollenkamp, 19 Ohio St. 3d 55, 62, 482 N.E.2d
1232, 1238 (1985). See also Brown & Dauer, Professional Responsibility in Nonadversarial
Lawyering: A Review of the Model Rules, 1982 A.B.F. REs. J. 519, 535 (noting that though the
Model Rules make great strides in regulating conduct within the firm, they do not resolve many
matters of concern to each attorney as an officer of the law).
108. "IT]he Code's provisions offer no guidance on the issue of the ethical duties of lawyers
who practice together in one firm, thus anachronistically speaking to the 500,000 lawyers in this
country as if they consisted entirely of single practitioners." Kanwit, Towards a Fairer Shake for
the A.B.A.'s Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 71 ILL. B.J. 283, 283 (1983).
109. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 6, at 453.
110. Id. (emphasis in original). On the former point, see, e.g., In re Brown, 389 Ill. 516, 59
N.E.2d 855 (1945); In re Luce, 83 Cal. 303, 23 P. 350 (1890), for illustrative case law. On the
latter point, the Rules have been criticized for giving little guidance to associates other than warn-
ing that they may be disciplined for violations of the Rules. The warning is stated in the preamble.
See Gross, Ethical Problems of Law Firm Associates, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259, 297 (1985).
See generally AMR Rules 5.1(c) and 5.2(a), 287 Ark. at 573-74, 702 S.W.2d at 378-79.
Il1. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 6, at 455.
112. Hayward & Hazard, Model Rules of Professional Conduct: A Perspective, 63 CHI. B.
REc. 290, 294 (1982). The authors also note that critics argue a duty of ethical supervision should
rest only on partners directly involved in the matter in question.
113. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 6, at 455.
114. 287 Ark. at 573, 702 S.W.2d at 378.
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on "supervisory lawyers," '115 such as the heads of business and govern-
ment departments, under Rule 5.1(b).111 Accordingly, practitioners
should take note that Rule 5.1(a) and (b) "establish new and indepen-
dent duties for supervisory lawyers and for partners in a firm." '17
Rule 5.2 is a companion to Rule 5.1, treating lawyers within the
same firm differently according to their hierarchical status, but from
the subordinate's point of view rather than the supervisor's. 1 8 Simply
stated, subordinates retain their professional responsibilities, regardless
of whether they acted at the direction of another. The freedom to act in
accordance with another's direction applies only to situations evidenc-
ing a "reasonable resolution" of an "arguable" question of professional
duty.
1 9
With regard to non-lawyer assistants, Rule 5.2 substantially paral-
lels Rule 5.1.120 The duty of reasonable supervision over non-lawyer
assistants was recognized, albeit more narrowly, under the former
Code. 121 While the supervisory attorney is not required to guarantee
that the non-lawyer will never engage in "incompatible"' 2 conduct, if
no precautionary steps are taken the lawyer violates the Rule whether
or not a non-lawyer associate actually misbehaves. 123 The lawyer is also
subject to disciplinary liability for a non-lawyer associate's violations of
the Rules if he knowingly either ratifies the conduct or fails to take
remedial action when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated. 124
4. Information About Legal Services
Because of the constitutional, commercial speech implications of a
lawyer's dissemination of information about legal services, 12 the rules
115. "Whether a lawyer has ... supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a ques-
tion of fact." Id.
116. AMR Rule 5.1(b) comment.
117. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 6, at 454.
118. Id. at 459.
119. AMR Rule 5.2, 287 Ark. at 574, 702 S.W.2d at 379, and comment thereto. For a
thorough discussion of an associate's ethical dilemmas including representative ethical problems,
see Gross, Ethical Problems of Law Firm Associates, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259 (1985).
120. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 6, at 463.
121. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(D) and 7-107(J).
122. Rule 5.3 uses the phrase conduct "compatible with the professional obligations of the
lawyer." 287 Ark. at 575, 702 S.W.2d at 379 (emphasis added).
123. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 6, at 464.
124. AMR Rule 5.3(c)(1) and (2), 287 Ark. at 575, 702 S.W.2d at 379.
125. See generally Note, Attorney Advertising-Constitutional Right to Advertise in Print
Media, 8 UALR L.J. 281 (1985-86).
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regulating advertising and solicitation'26 deal with one of the most dy-
namic areas of professional ethics.12 7 With one possible exception, these
provisions essentially either ban only false or misleading communica-
tions, 2 8 or impose reasonable disclosure 29 or record-keeping' 30 require-
ments. Thus, they are consistent with the Supreme Court's latest pro-
nouncements in this area. 3' The possible exception is contained in
Rule 7.3, governing direct contact with prospective clients. 3 2 The Rule
excepts from its anti-solicitation rule only "letters ...or advertising
circulars distributed generally to persons not known to need legal ser-
vices of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular mat-
126. AMR Rules 7.1-7.5, 287 Ark. at 582-89, 702 S.W.2d at 384-89.
127. THE MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, which initially prohibited any
direct or indirect lawyer advertising, was promulgated by the ABA on August 12, 1969, and
adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court on February 23, 1970. Wright, The Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REV. I (1970). The United States
Supreme Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), recognizing a
constitutional right for lawyers to advertise, prompted the ABA to draft revisions to the Code.
Comment, Bates & O'Sheen v. State Bar of Arizona: From the Court to the Bar to the Con-
sumer, 9 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 477 (1978). In July, 1978, the debate was carried on in Arkansas,
which adopted a regulatory revision defining what was permissible advertising. See Robinson, The
Arkansas Code of Professional Responsibility, 33 ARK. L. REV. 605, 608 n.14 (1980); In re
Amendments to the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Judicial Ethics, 263 Ark.
948 (1978) (Fogleman, J., concurring and Howard, J. dissenting). The Model Rules, as adopted
in Arkansas, are constitutional in their regulation of advertising, but may be too restrictive in
their anti-solicitation regulations. See infra, notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Rule 7.1, 287 Ark. at 582, 702 S.W.2d at 384. Note that the rule governs all
communications about legal services whether oral or written. "False or misleading" advertising is
defined as a material misrepresentation, the omission of a material fact, communications likely to
create an unjustified expectation of the results the lawyer can achieve or that results can be
achieved by unethical or unlawful means, and comparisons with other lawyers' services that can
not be factually sustained. The Supreme Court has consistently identified these types of practices
as potentially misleading in the context of advertising professional services, but has not addressed
the constitutionality of the statutory definitions. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 & n.14.
129. See Rules 7.2(d), 7.3, 7.5(b), 287 Ark. at 583, 585, and 589, 702 S.W.2d at 385-86,
and 389. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2282 (1985), held "that an
advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably re-
lated to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers."
130. AMR Rules 7.2(b) and 7.3 require copies of written communications which are distrib-
uted directly to the consumer to be kept for five years, as opposed to the ABA's version of two
years. See In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n Petition, 287 Ark. at 497-98, Exhibit B, 702 S.W.2d at 327
(1985). In In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206 & nn. 19-20 (1982), the Court implicitly approved of
the ABA's approach as an example of the reasonable supervision of general mailings, which is no
more extensive than necessary to serve the governmental interest. Whether the Arkansas version
of the Model Rules is also "no more extensive than necessary" or an unduly burdensome restric-
tion is subject to debate.
131. See Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985); R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982). The test for com-
mercial speech is summarized and then applied to advertising for professional services in both
cases.
132. AMR Rule 7.3, 287 Ark. at 585, 702 S.W.2d at 386.
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ter. . . 3 The comment to Rule 7.3 appears to interpret this provi-
sion as permitting general mailings, but prohibiting targeted
mailings."" The growing number of courts that have addressed the is-
sue of direct mail solicitation have generally concluded that the state's
interest in regulating commercial speech does not justify an outright
prohibition of direct mail advertising.3 5 Three courts 13  have collec-
tively rejected arguments in favor of an outright prohibition. The argu-
ments are based on the potential for "ambulance chasing," stirring up
litigation, deception, invasion of privacy, undue influence and over-
reaching, over-commercialization, and that such regulation is a permis-
sible time, place, and manner restriction. Also rejected were assertions
that direct mailings by lawyers are likely to be treated differently by
consumers, could give rise to conflicts of interest, or share the same
concerns as face-to-face solicitation. In the Supreme Court's most re-
cent opinion on lawyer advertising, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel,13 7 the Court found an advertisement geared toward persons
injured by the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device unobjectionable.
Among other things, the advertisement was not misleading and the
concerns justifying the ban on in-person solicitation in Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association13 8 were not present. 3 9 Indeed, the Court stated
133. Id.
134. Id., 287 Ark. at 586, 702 S.W.2d at 387.
135. For a thorough analysis of the pertinent decisions in this area, see Adams v. Attorney
Registration & Disciplinary Commission, 617 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. I11. 1985) (granting a prelimi-
nary injunction against enforcement of a rule substantially similar to Arkansas' Rule 7.3). See
also, In re Von Wiegen, 101 A.D.2d 627, 474 N.Y.S.2d 147, modified 63 N.Y.2d 163, 481
N.Y.S.2d 40, 470 N.E.2d 838 (1984), cert, denied, 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985) (blanket prohibitions
applied to letter sent to the 250 victims of the Hyatt "skywalk" accident violated the attorney's
first amendment rights); Spencer v. Honorable Justices of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 579 F.
Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (declaratory judgment that prohibition against direct mailing is uncon-
stitutional). But see State v. Moses, 231 Kan. 243, 642 P.2d 1004 (1982); Dayton Bar Association
v. Herzog, 70 Ohio St. 2d 261, 436 N.E.2d 1037 (1982); Michigan State Bar, Formal Op. C-236
(1985) (deciding that although nondeceptive advertising regarding specific legal problems can no
longer be prohibited, targeted mailing to or direct solicitation of individuals with identified legal
problems still can be).
136. See Adams, Von Wiegen, and Spencer, supra note 135.
137. 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
138. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). The Court in Ohralik concluded that in-person solicitation by a
lawyer was a practice rife with possibilities for over-reaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of
undue influence, and outright fraud. Id. at 464-65. Significantly, the Court also noted the unique
regulatory difficulties presented because in-person solicitation is "not visible or otherwise open to
public scrutiny." Id. at 466, quoted in Zauderer, 106 S. Ct. at 2277. But cf. In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412 (1978) (affording full first amendment protection since political expression and associa-
tion were present).
139. Zauderer, 106 S. Ct. at 2276-80. The Court noted that printed advertising is more
conducive to reflection and the exercise of personal choice than personal solicitation by a trained
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that "[a]n attorney may not be disciplined for soliciting legal business
through printed advertising containing truthful and non-deceptive in-
formation and advice regarding the legal rights of potential clients." 140
Given the Zauderer decision, if the term "solicit" as used in Rule 7.3 is
construed to prohibit targeted mailings, it is doubtful it could withstand
a constitutional challenge. 4'
CONCLUSION
Perhaps too often in the past the rules of ethics have been disre-
garded with the justification that "that isn't the way it works in the
real world."' 4 The present Rules are less susceptible to such criticisms
since they contain a modern, comprehensive approach to the lawyer's
role in the profession and in society. Their guidance begins with the
initial attorney-client encounter by requiring the open communication
conducive to informed, but ethical decision-making. They address the
lawyer's relation to third parties, his role as counselor, and his para-
mount duty to the tribunal as an advocate. The Rules for the first time
define ethical conduct within the law firm, requiring affirmative action
to ensure professional responsibility. They also address the public ser-
vice aspects of members of the bar and their duties to the profession.
With regard to attorney advertising and solicitation, the pitfalls of
the Rules as they apply to direct mailings have been indicated in the
previous discussion.'48 However, the fact that restrictions in this area
must be narrowly drawn should not be permitted to discourage the bar
advocate. Id. at 2277.
140. id. at 2280.
141. In addition to the lack of in-person solicitation concerns, the unique regulatory difficul-
ties of in-person solicitation are not shared by direct mail solicitation. Although the comment to
Rule 7.3 states that "[d]irect mail solicitation cannot be effectively regulated by means less dras-
tic than outright prohibition," it also states that "[aidvertising is out in public view, thus subject
to scrutiny by those who know the lawyer. This informal review is itself likely to help guard
against statements and claims that might constitute false or misleading communications ....
AMR Rule 7.3 comment, 287 Ark. at 586, 702 S.W.2d at 387. Such advertising is also subject to
scrutiny by its recipients, who need only pick up the telephone to inform the Arkansas Committee
on Professional Conduct about unsubstantiated advertising. Further, the less restrictive alternative
of requiring a copy of all general mailings to be filed with the Committee, proposed in R.M.J.,
455 U.S. at 206, is available to the state, and Arkansas' Rule 7.3 already takes the precaution of
requiring that the word "advertising" be clearly marked on all written communications. 287 Ark.
at 585, 702 S.W.2d at 386.
142. However, if the rules of ethics do not work in the "real" world, we have nobody to
blame but ourselves. Arkansas' teacher testing laws, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1270 to 1270.4
(Supp. 1985), give us a "down-home" example of what can happen when a self-regulating profes-
sion fails to take appropriate action to maintain the public's confidence.
143. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
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from promoting professionalism in advertising. The enhanced protec-
tion that has been given to advertising with regard to specific legal
problems presents an increased potential for impermissible solicitation.
Consumers who have recently experienced either financial or personal
tragedies can be particularly susceptible to targeted advertisements. A
proposed solution to targeting distressed consumers is presently being
considered by the Massachusetts Supreme Court.14" The proposal
would prohibit any type of solicitation directed to clients whose physi-
cal or emotional state make them particularly vulnerable to solicitation
or who have made known their desire not to be solicited. 14 5 Since the
regulation is aimed at uncontrovertible invasions of privacy and the ex-
ercise of undue influence, no constitutional objection is apparent on its
face.
In contrast to the majority of its provisions, the Rules do not adopt
an affirmative approach toward dealing with the special problems of
the broadcast media. 4" The comment to Rule 7.2 recognizes the power
of television for getting information to the public in support of the
Rule's position not to impede this flow of information by limiting the
type of information that can be advertised. 147 This approach is proba-
bly the best available at the present time, at least until the use of radio
and/or television has been shown to be subject to abuse. 148 However,
because the broadcast media is such a powerful tool, with live actors, it
more closely resembles in-person solicitation than does the use of direct
mailings. Thus, a proposal such as the one Massachusetts is presently
considering, prohibiting advertising directed at vulnerable consumers,
may be a permissible solution in the event such abuses occur.
As the previous discussion indicates, the lawyer's code of ethics
must necessarily change with the times and the substantive law. Arkan-
sas' new rules are suitably structured for this purpose. In addition to
the practical guidance the Rules give in the modern legal world, their
division according to various aspects of the lawyer's duties makes them
an easily accessible reference. In sum, the Rules should foster our own
ability to maintain the integrity of our profession and the public's confi-
dence in us. For in the final analysis,
144. See 54 U.S.L.W. 2418 (Feb. 18, 1986).
145. Id.
146. Advertising by radio or television is subject to the same restrictions as other forms of
advertising pursuant to Rule 7.2(a). 287 Ark. at 583, 702 S.W.2d at 385.
147. 287 Ark. at 584, 702 S.W.2d at 385.
148. Once experience has proven a particular content or method of advertising is subject to
abuse, the states may impose appropriate restrictions. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
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[we] lawyers, as officers of the law, exist not for our own sakes, but
for our potential and actual clients and for all nonlawyers. To say that
we serve a public role means that the public has a use for us. We
more than others should act to optimize that use."49
The adoption of the Model Rules should be helpful in this en-
deavor. They represent an up-to-date approach to dealing with ethical
problems, and are conducive to any modifications the bar may find ap-
propriate. Thus, they should be deemed a welcome addition to profes-
sional responsibility in Arkansas.
Daniel L. Parker
149. Brown & Dauer, Professional Responsibility in Nonadversarial Lawyering. A Review
of the Model Rules, 1982 A.B.F. REs. J. 519, 535.
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